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1. The PPR must select the most effective methods to achieve its objectives. A very close and real relationship must exist between the highest and lowest echelons of the Party, as well as between the Party and the nation, and no unpleasant incident should pass unnoticed. All Party mistakes should immediately be reported. Should the attitude toward the Party and its leaders be anything but sympathetic and sincere, reasons should be determined.
2. Strong divergencies of opinion between lower echelons of the PPR and PPS should be smoothed, and friction between the committees should not be permitted to develop.
3. Observe our fully the methods and work of the opposition, particularly the illegal one, and try to determine wherein the people support or distrust it. We must remember that the opposition, now deprived of power, will attempt a comeback at the proper time, when it will appeal to the masses and endeavor to turn them against the Government.
4. PPR must find the right approach to the nation. Seeking this approach and discovering a compromise are the essence of every political maneuver. PPR seems to oppose compromise, but this is a misunderstanding. According to our philosophy compromise is always advisable when it implies abandoning a lesser objective for the sake of a more important one. Some of our comrades confuse compromise with opportunism, with the result that an important objective may be lost for the sake of a trifle. This has been the case in considerations as to whether to merge with the PPS. It is much more important for the PPR to come to a fusion with the PPS than to consider questions of prestige or personal ambition. This misunderstanding should be clarified within the Party.
5. PPS must look for valuable democratic elements in the ranks of the legal opposition. Not every PSL member is an enemy of Poland, an enemy of progress or a friend of the Germans. Our attitude is different toward the illegal opposition, which regards us with fanatic hatred. WIN is dangerous because of its mafia-like character, ruthless actions and its good intelligence technique. WIN is trying to create a "nation-wide political orientation" which would unite all national trends. The essence of its activity is to fight the USSR and PPR, and its foreign policy is based on the Anglo-Saxon orientation. WIN has shown itself to be more active, better organized and more self-sacrificing than the PSL.

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